malpractice suits brought against them for their conduct in state court proceedings. 5 As a result of these two cases, a court-appointed attorney will receive no federal immunity from state malpractice liability, regardless of whether the attorney was appointed by a federal or a state court. However, on the state level, only the courts of Pennsylvania and Connecticut have decided whether their respective state laws provide immunity to court-appointed attorneys. 6 State legislatures, as well as Congress, may wish to provide statutory protection for court-appointed attorneys. The issue of immunity of a public defender, therefore, must be analyzed carefully to determine the advisability of providing immunity either by statute or by state court decisions.
Prior to these two cases, most suits by indigent defendants against their government-appointed attorneys were brought in federal court and stated claims based on a deprivation of the defendants' constitutional right of representation. If the attorney had been assigned by a federal court to represent the defendant in a federal criminal trial, 7 the indigent alleged that the attorney's representation had been so inadequate that it violated his sixth amendment right to counsel.' If, on the other hand, s 406 A.2d at 739 (plurality opinion). 6 Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. at 576, 362 A.2d at 879; Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d at 739. 7 Many attorneys representing indigents in federal trials are private attorneys who have been appointed by the court to represent specific clients. They receive some compensation from the federal government for the time they spend representing indigents. In 1970 Congress did permit the establishment of full time public defenders offices to supplement the individual appointments of private attorneys. For a discussion of the federal system for providing representation to indigent defendants, see Ferri v. Ackerman, 100 S. Ct. at 407 n.16.
' The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1979) , for example, the plaintiff sued the federal court-appointed attorney who had represented him in his criminal trial in federal court. Appearing pro se, the plaintiff relied upon 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1976) to get jurisdiction in the federal court. The Second Circuit, in a footnote, acknowledged that § 1983 was not really applicable in this case because § 1983 requires that the violation of the consti-the indigent had been tried in state court and had been represented by a state public defender, the indigent alleged that the public defender had violated section 1983 of the Civil Rights Acts. 9 The indigent was required to prove that the state public defender's conduct constituted state action and that the representation was so inadequate as to deprive the indigent of his constitutional right to counsel.
10
It is difficult to determine precisely why the indigents decided to allege constitutional violations instead of simple torts. Perhaps they believed that federal judges would be more sympathetic to them. At least one commentator has suggested that suits were brought under section 1983 because courts could award nominal or punitive damages under that statute while only actual damages could be recovered in a tort action. 1 Whatever the reasons behind the filing of the actions in federal court, to date no suit alleging violation of the constitutional right to counsel has been successful. Actions brought against attorneys appointed to represent defendants in federal court have failed for one of two reasons. In some cases the courts have held that the activities of courtappointed attorneys do not constitute federal action since the attorneys are not federal officials.' 2 One court has taken the position that even if the federal action requirement is met, the attorneys are tutional right occur under color of state law. Here there was no state action because the entire conduct in question took place in federal court by a federal court-appointed attorney. Instead of being a § 1983 suit, the Second Circuit said the action was actually brought under general constitutional provisions, i.e., the sixth amendment. Such a suit, said the court, required federal action just like a § 1983 suit required state action. Therefore, the court used the analysis found in § 1983 cases to determine that there was no cause of action under the United States Constitution. 594 F.2d at 924 n.1. 9 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) 103 (1945) ). For a discussion of the general increase in § 1983 litigation that followed the Monroe decision, see Developments in the LawSection 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133 , 1136 n.7 (1977 .
15 See, e.g., Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648, 650 (9th Cir. 1977 The rationale is that since all other court officials-the judge, the prosecutor, and the clerk of the court-are immune from suits, the public defender also must be immune in order to encourage the recruitment of sensitive and thoughtful lawyers to those positions. Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d at 1049. 2' If the public defenders were liable, they would not be able to exercise their discretion because they "would be constrained to weigh every decision in terms of potential liability." Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d Certain public officials are granted immunity to enable them to perform their duties in the most effective manner. It is believed that public officials should represent the interests of all, not just the interests of one individual or group. Because not everyone will be satisfied with the decisions made in the public interest, public officials potentially could be the victims of frequent litigation by unhappy groups. In order to free public officials from this fear of liability and in order to save government time that would be spent defending the suits, public officials are granted immunity. Because governments only grant immunity to enable public officials to make decisions that are in the public interest, not everyone employed by 21 See, e.g., Hyde v. Lakewood, 2 Ohio St. 2d 155, 156, 207 N.E.2d 547, 549 (1965 
Harlan wrote in Barr:
The reasons for the recognition of the privilege have been often stated. It has been thought important that officials of government should be free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts done in the course of those duties-suits which would consume time and energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service and the threat of which might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government. Various states, while agreeing that officials exercising discretion on basic policy decisions are entitled to immunity, have expressed the rationale behind the immunity in different ways. For example, California justifies immunity for state officials making basic policy decisions on the grounds that if they were not immune, the courts would be 'in the unseemly position of determining the propriety of decisions expressly entrusted to a coordinate branch of government."' Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 445, 551 P.2d 334, 350, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 30 (1976) (quoting Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 793, 447 P.2d 352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 248 (1968) ). Pennsylvania has sovereign immunity so that public officials will not be afraid to act where their action cannot be measured by predictable standards of care. DuBree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 544, 393 A.2d 293, 295 (1978) .
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LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED ATTORNEYS
the government is entitled to immunity. Only those who exercise policymaking functions receive this protection.2 Furthermore, not even all those exercising discretion are exempted from full liability. Absolute immunity is only given to those who participate in the judicial process asjudges, 2 prosecutors, 3 " grand jurors, 3 ' and other similar positions. 32 There is total immunity for them because they are more likely to be sued than others and because there are safeguards in the judicial process itself to protect people from the errors of these officials.33 Those government officials not performing some type ofjudicial function usually are given only qualified immunity from suit. Under this type of immunity, they are not liable for mere mistakes in judgment, but they can be sued if they knew or should have known that their actions violated clearly established laws.?
Prior to Ferri and Reese, there was no consensus on whether government-appointed attorneys for indigents were granted any type of immunity from tort malpractice suits. One case assumed that a court-appointed attorney in a federal trial could be sued for malpractice in state court, but that assumption was not crucial to the resolution of the case.'" Two other cases, in brief one-page opinions, held that there was immunity for federally appointed defense attorneys. [t] he common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that underlie the commonlaw immunities ofjudges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties").
2 Economou v. Butz, 438 U.S. at 512 (holding that administrative officials who performed functions similar to those performed by judges and prosecutors were absolutely immune from suit).
3 Id. These safeguards include the adversary nature of the process, the importance of precedent in resolving controversies, and the correctability of error on appeal.
34 Id. at 506-07.
3 Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1979) . 3 6 Sullens v. Carroll, 446 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1971 ; Jones v. Warlick, 364 F.2d 828 (4th Cir. 1966) .
17 Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 362 A.2d 871 (1975) . The court in Spring considered three arguments supporting immunity for state public defenders and rejected all of them. First, it held that public defenders are ognized the possibility that Illinois might grant state court-appointed attorneys immunitys but a later Seventh Circuit case held that Illinois would recognize malpractice actions against state public defenders.
3 9 Another federal court also stated in dicta that North Carolina might grant state public defenders immunity.
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Ferri and Reese brought direction to this confusing, contradictory array of cases. In Ferri, the Supreme Court determined that federal law does not grant government-appointed attorneys immunity from state malpractice suits.
4t Reese represented the first extensive state court treatment of the immunity problem, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court came to the same conclusion as the federal court-no common-law right of immunity. 42 Together these cases substantially bolster the view not judicial officers. Since they perform a private function, not a public one, they do not have the type of immunity shared by judges and prosecutors and others who represent the public in court. Second, the court held that a public defender was not a public official like a legislator because the defender did not perform any government functions. Instead of protecting the public, he had to protect his "client." Finally, there was no statute granting the public defender immunity. 38 Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1973) . In Walker, the client had appealed his Illinois conviction in Illinois court, alleging among other things that his courtappointed attorney's incompetence caused his conviction. Walker v. Pate, 53 Ill. 2d 485, 292 N.E.2d 387 (1973) . The client also brought a malpractice suit in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d at 803. After the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, the Seventh Circuit said that the Illinois courts might find that there was no cause of action for malpractice for any one of a number of reasons. One reason was that Illinois might provide immunity to court-appointed attorneys. The court said that "there are strong reasons of policy which might persuade the Illinois courts to hold that a lawyer, who has been appointed to serve without compensation in the defense of an indigent citizen accused of crime, should be immune from malpractice liability." Id. at 804. Requiring an attorney to defend malpractice charges would only make it difficult for the Bar to discharge its professional responsibilities. Id. Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978 
5 ' The attorney had been appointed and compensated pursuant to a federal statute, and he had participated in a federal proceeding. However, the Court found no statutory basis for a grant of immunity to federally appointed attorneys. 52 The only arguably relevant statute, the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 53 attempted to minimize the difference between privately retained and court-appointed counsel by compensating appointed attorneys. The implication from the purpose of the law was that appointed attorneys should be subject to the same liability that retained lawyers face.
54
The Court went on to recognize that some federal officers have been granted immunity in the absence of any statute.
5 5 It reasoned that the duties of federally appointed attorneys, however, were significantly different from the duties of those officials who had been granted immunity at common law, such as judges and prosecutors. Such officials were required to represent the interests of society as a whole. The immunity granted to them was designed as a protection from disgruntled groups whose desires were not always identical to those of the public. In contrast, an appointed attorney's only duty was to the defendant he was appointed to represent. He had no conflicting responsibility to the public and could avoid malpractice suits by fulfilling his duty to the defendant.' The Court did acknowledge that there might be policy reasons to grant appointed counsel immunity. For example, immunity might be needed to recruit attorneys. Nevertheless, the Court held that the legislature must be the one to determine whether to grant immunity because of policy concerns. 6 Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d at 740. Justice Nix took the approach that public defenders are not public officials and that public policy dictates that they be made liable for their negligence. Id. Justice Manderino, in a concurring opinion, agreed with Justice Nix's opinion except that Manderino wished to stress that a public defender represents the sovereign in the same way that a district attorney does and that neither party in a criminal proceeding should put the sovereign's interest in conviction ahead of fairness to the defendant. Id. at 741 (Manderino, J., concurring). In a second concurring opinion, Justice Roberts, writing for himself and for Justice Larsen, stressed that public defenders exercise no more discretion than do private attorneys. He pointed out that granting immunity to public defenders would only cause the poor to receive legal services inferior to those received by paying defendants. Id. at 741 (Roberts, J., concurring).
by announcing that the case was governed by Pennsylvania state law on official immunity.63 The cases on the federal common law of immunity' and the cases that dealt with the state-action requirement for purposes of section 1983 were not controlling because Reese involved neither a federal defender nor a federal claim.5
According to Justice Nix, the determination of a state public defender's immunity under Pennsylvania law depended on whether he was a public official, in which case he would get some measure of immunity, or whether he was only a public employee and thus entitled to no immunity.' Justice Nix based his decision that the public defender was an employee rather than an official on the fact that a public defender does not exercise the sovereign function of policymaking.
67 In contrast to a Ferri v. Ackerman, 483 Pa. 90, 394 A.2d 553 (1978 ), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 402 (1979 . It is interesting to note that in Ferri the court held that a federal court-appointed attorney was immune from a state malpractice suit on the basis of the federal common law of immunity, while in Reese the court held that a state public defender was not immune from a state malpractice suit. Justice Nix authored the opinion in both cases. In Ferri v. Ackerman, 394 A.2d at 558-59, Justices Roberts and Larsen dissented, using the same reasons they later relied on for their concurrence in Reese. See note 70 infra. 65 406 A.2d at 737. I Id. at 737. Justice Nix acknowledged that in the previous year the court had changed the doctrine of official immunity in its decision in DuBree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978) . However, in a footnote,Justice Nix simply stated that DuBree contracted the scope of official immunity so it was necessary to determine first whether state public defenders could even meet the broader guidelines for immunity found in the older cases. 406 A.2d at 737 n.7.
6 406 A.2d at 738. In determining that a public defender was not a public official, Justice Nix relied upon a previous Pennsylvania Supreme Court case in which the court held that a county solicitor was not a public official. Commonwealth ex rel. Foreman v. Hampson, 393 Pa. 467, 143 A.2d 369 (1958) . However, in Foreman the court was not determining whether the solicitor was a district attorney who represents the interests of the county, a public defender does not represent the public but instead represents his appointed ,,client. ' ' 68 In his opinion, Justice Nix rejected the defenders' arguments that immunity is needed to recruit good lawyers and to encourage the public defenders to use their discretion to perform their functions responsibly. 69 He argued that the Pennsylvania court does not determine whether a person has sovereign immunity by examining the effect that tort liability will have on the office. Instead, the court determines which people have immunity by looking at the functions they perform. Only officials who perform policymaking functions have immunity and since public defenders have no policymaking function, Justice Nix concluded that they are not entitled to immunity.
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public official for purposes of granting him immunity. Instead, the issue in .that case was whether the solicitor as a public official had to be appointed from among the residents in the county. The court did not want to require solicitors to be residents because the particular county involved in the case had only 5,000 residents and three practicing attorneys residing there, one of whom was already the district attorney. If the county government could choose from among only those three lawyers, it would not have had much of a selection. Therefore, the court held that the county solicitor was simply a professional employee, not a public official. Obviously, different criteria would be relevant to the question of sovereign immunity than were involved in a determination of residency requirements. 6 406 A.2d at 738. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 372, 93 A.2d 834, 842 (1953) , had held that district attorneys are public officials.
This was the only point of disagreement between Justices Nix and Manderino. Justice Manderino agreed with the holding in Reese that public defenders are not public officials who are entitled to sovereign immunity. However, he took pains to stress that neither the district attorney nor the public defender should allow their actions to be controlled by outside forces and both had a responsibility to see that no criminal defendant was convicted unjustly. His concurrence probably was intended to rebut any suggestion that district attorneys were controlled by the state and wanted to try to convict innocent people. 406 A.2d at 741 (Manderino, J., concurring).
6 406 A.2d at 740. 70 Id. In their concurrence, Justices Roberts and Larsen specifically refuted the idea that public defenders need to be immune so that they will perform theirjobs professionally. The justices argued that public defenders are just like private attorneys and need no more freedom or encouragement to exercise their professional judgment than private attorneys. Since private attorneys can exercise their judgment in spite of their liability for any Justice Nix also reasoned that granting public defenders immunity would cause equal protection problems because a paying client could get relief from his attorney's malpractice in situations where an indigent could not. 7 1 Therefore, even if public defenders did perform policymaking functions and thus were entitled to immunity under state law, Justice Nix thought the equal protection clause prevented the states from granting them immunity.
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The two dissenting justices did not discuss whether public defenders were considered public officials or public employees. 73 One of the dissenters noted that during the previous term the court had held that sovereign immunity did not depend solely upon whether someone was classified as a public official, but instead was determined on the basis of a case-by-case analysis of whether the grant of immunity would further the policies behind protection of officials from liability. 74 Under the current law, said the dissenters, a public servant is entitled to immunity only when his duties are such that they require an exercise of discretion that would be hampered if he were subject to liability. Therefore, it does not matter how a public defender is classified; what is important is whether granting the public defender immunity would advance the policies that immunity is supposed to further.
75
Both dissenters agreed that public policy did require immunity, 76 relying on the same policy reasons expressed in the federal cases that had held that public defenders are immune from section 1983 actions. 7 7 These reasons are the need to recruit and to retain lawyers as public defenders and the necessity "to encourage counsel in the full exercise of professionalism, i.e., the unfettered discretion, in the light negligence, public defenders also should be able to perform responsibly without immunity. DuBree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978) .
75 406 A.2d at 741 (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 746.
77Justice O'Brien cited Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899, 900-01 (4th Cir. 1976 ), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977 , John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 1973 ), and Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046 , 1049 (3d Cir. 1972 ), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973 , as cases using these policy reasons to support their decisions to give public defenders some type of immunity from § 1983 suits. 406 A.2d at 745 (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
of their training and experience, to decline to press the frivolous, to assign priorities between indigent litigants, and to make strategic decisions with regard to a single litigant as to how best his interests may be advanced."
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The dissent also took the position that immunity did not present any equal protection problems. 7 9
They pointed out that the Supreme Court had held that not all people must have exactly equal advantages.
8° As long as the grant of immunity furthers a legitimate state interest, which it does by advancing the previously discussed policies, 8 ' it does not violate the equal protection clause.
82
Nor did the dissent agree that the grant of immunity would violate the state's obligation to provide counsel for indigents. They took the position that the state had fulfilled that duty simply by establishing public defenders' offices and that disciplinary proceedings could be used to ensure that the counsel was effective. 
ANALYSIS OF IMMUNITY UNDER THE COMMON LAW
Despite the vigorous dissent in Reese, both Ferri and Reese correctly applied the traditional views concerning official immunity in reaching their conclusions that the government-appointed attorneys in those cases were not entitled to immunity. As discussed above, 8 ' immunity traditionally has been granted to protect the proper functioning of government. Officials in policymaking positions have been granted immunity because they must consider the welfare of all citizens, not just the interests of the most litigious group. Neither federally appointed attorneys nor state public defenders, however, have policymaking roles. Their job is not to determine what is in the best interest of the public as a whole. Instead, they must be advocates only for their assigned defendants. Unlike other public servants, they do not have to juggle interests; they only have to pursue the interests of their clients, 78 Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d at 901, quoted in Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d at 744 (O'Brien, J., dissenting) .
9 406 A.2d at 742 (O'Brien, J., dissenting). 80 Id. at 742 (citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) 88 100 S. Ct. at 410. The Court in Ferri said that the respondent had failed to present any empirical data to support the policy reasons he advanced in favor of immunity, id. at 407 n.17, and took the position that the legislature was better able to evaluate any empirical evidence that would be available. Id. at 410.
s9 As discussed in the text accompanying notes 28-34 supra, there are two types of immunity, absolute and qualified. Because absolute immunity would eliminate all suits against government-appointed attorneys, it would achieve the policy reasons favoring immunity more when they try to decide how to appeal convictions. Public defenders sometimes appeal on the basis that the defendant had ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.
03 If public defenders know they will be liable for malpractice, they are less likely to make this argument. It is true that at least one court has held that if an attorney argues ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, that argument will not be taken as an admission, and the appeal cannot be used as evidence against the attorney in a malpractice suitY' 4 Most government-appointed attorneys, however, would probably not want to give their clients the idea for a malpractice suit.
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Thus, immunity would provide indigents with more effective counsel in three ways. First it would help recruit competent attorneys. Second, it would give the attorney more time to devote to his client. Third, it would allow the attorney to exercise his professional judgment on defense strategies, particularly on appeal arguments. There is no evidence, though, that a client's right to a malpractice action guarantees him better service from a professional. The number of medical malpractice actions have increased substantially recently, yet there is no evidence that medical care has been improved because of these suits."
5 Legal malpractice actions are also unlikely to produce better legal care. In fact, immunity laws actually would improve the effectiveness of counsel for indigents.
1 6 By aiding in recruitment, the statutes would upgrade the quantity and quality of court-appointed counsel. In addition, counsel would have time to devote to their clients and would be able to make the best decisions for their clients. Moreover, there are other ways to ensure that indigents receive effective counsel apart from malpractice actions. Defendants who are the victims of poor legal advice can file habeas corpus actions or appeal on the grounds of inadequate assistance of counsel.
117 In addition, the incompetent public 501, 517-19 (1976) . O'Connell notes: "Even Guido Calabresi, perhaps the leading advocate of imaginative use of the tort and insurance system to achieve deterrence, recently concluded that there is no basis for believing that the present tort liability system promotes quality medical care." Id. at 519.
11 See text accompanying notes 90-105 supra. 17 See Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d at 410; Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d at 902; Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d at 1049. defender can be disciplined in several ways. The government can fire him and thus guarantee that he does not injure other indigent defendants. In addition, the supreme courts of the various states can disbar the defender or otherwise impose sanctions on him if he does not represent his client competently. 1 8
CONCLUSION
While not liable for malpractice based on constitutional or section 1983 claims, government-appointed attorneys after Ferri and Reese could be liable under state tort actions for malpractice. The Court in Ferri has said that federal law does not give federally appointed attorneys immunity from state malpractice suits. With Reese, there have now been two major decisions holding that state public defenders, and, by implication, federally appointed attorneys, are not granted immunity by the states from state malpractice actions.
Although these decisions correctly follow the precedents on immunity, the outcome can and should be changed by appropriate legislative action. Granting government-appointed attorneys immunity would help recruit competent counsel and would give them more time to devote to their cases. Counsel also would be able to exercise professional judgment on all matters of the defense, including whether to appeal on the basis of inadequate counsel at trial. Moreover, all this can be done without creating equal protection problems or leading to ineffective assistance of counsel.
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